'In a world of "scientific" objects, objects characterizable by the vocabulary of physics alone, in a world governed by what we now believe to be the laws of nature, can anything be coloured?' I am here concerned to examine the claims of those physicalists who are disposed to give an affirmative answer to that question. In so doing, I shall restrict my attention to the physics of the present time, helping myself to the rather generous assumption that the vocabulary and laws of physiology need not, in the last analysis, outrun those of physics. The physics of the present day is assuredly not engraved in stone, but the parts of it which have to do with the sources of electromagnetic radiation and its interaction with animal tissue-the only parts which have any conceivable bearing on colour vision-are unlikely to see significant revision.1 What are colours? It seems clear that a proper understanding of colours must proceed from sensory acquaintance: the congenitally blind man cannot have an adequate conception of colour. But it is equally apparent that colours are more than simple, ineffable qualia. Hume's missing shade of blue rather effectively makes that point. Our concept of colour involves not only manifest colours, but a whole set of ordering relationships among them. Every colour is specifiable by three dimensions: hue, brightness and saturation.2 Colours of a given hue may be linearly ordered according to brightness, if saturation is held constant, and according to saturation if brightness is held constant. Holding both brightness and saturation constant, the hues may be ordered in a closed array, the end points of the spectral hues being connected through an array of non-spectral purples. These relationships among colours cannot, of course, be extracted from the bare presentation of a single colour sample any more than its i 800 angle sum can be extracted from the 
bare presentation of a triangle. Nevertheless, it is as much an essential property of a colour that it requires exactly three independent parameters for its specification as it is an essential property of, say, a complex number that it requires exactly two real numbers for its specification.
Are there other essential properties of the colours? To see that there are, consider the following situation. ' An experimental subject is taught to use a monochromator, a device which permits its operator to select a single wavelength in the band of visible light, which extends from approximately 450 nm to about 700 nm. (One nanometer = one billionth of a metre.) Suppose the subject is asked to find a green which is neither yellow nor blue. Will she be able to understand and execute the instruction? Indeed she will, and a normal subject will select a wavelength around 503 nm. Asked to find a blue which is neither red nor green, she makes a selection at about 475 nm. A yellow which is neither red nor green will be near 590 nm. There is no single wavelength which gives a red free of a yellowish tinge, but an appropriate mixture of two wavelengths from opposite ends of the spectrum will yield such a red. Very well. Now suppose she is asked to find an orange which is neither red nor yellow. What will she do? She will wonder just what is being required of her, for every orange has both red and yellow in it. She will be able to find an orange which has as much red as it has yellow, but this is quite another matter. Now most colours are visibly composite in hue like orange, rather than visibly simple in hue, like green. In fact, there exist only four hues which have none of their neighbors as constituents: these are called unique hues. There exist a unique red, a unique green, a unique yellow and a unique blue. Hues like orange or turquoise are known as binary hues. in a unique circular array. We may see this by noticing that if there were reddish greens there would exist a resemblance path from red to green which did not go through either yellow or blue. If there were yellowish blues there would be a resemblance path from yellow to blue which did not go through either red or green. The resemblance order would thus fail to be unique.
I therefore claim that any sy'stem of properties with which the colours can be theoretically identified, or upon which colours can supervene, must have structural analogues to the dimensions of hue, saturation and brightness as well as to the unique hues and opponent relationships. Any theory which does not have an account of these characteristics may be a theory of wavelength discrimination, but it will not be a theory of colour.
How, then, might some scientific objects be coloured? There are two types of answers which have been discussed in the philosophical literature. The first of these I shall call objectivism. According to objectivists, colours are either identical with clusters of physical properties or else supervenient upon such property-clusters. The existence of colour instances, says the objectivist, does not depend upon the existence of perceiving animals, although the detection of colours does.
Since it is by virtue of our eyes being stimulated by electromagnetic energy of between 450 nm and 700 nm in wavelength that we typically experience colours, the natural physical candidate for colour is either some characteristic of electromagnetic radiation or some property of the coloured object which is responsible for that energy leaving the surface of the object in the way in which it does. Let us first consider electromagnetic radiation.
Light has properties that may appear to answer to brightness, saturation and hue. It looks plausible to identify brightness with an appropriate function of intensity, hue with determinate wavelength, and saturation with the relative proportion of that wavelength and the broad-band radiation known as 'white' light. However, none of these identifications will do. Yellow, for instance, is intrinsically less saturated than green. That is, a 58o nm light will be perceived as less saturated than a 503 nm light even though each stimulus consists of a single wavelength. I Brightness can at best be seen as a function of relative rather than absolute intensity. Furthermore, it is also strongly a function of contrast of the target A recent discussion listed fourteen distinct categories of physical processes by which visible light may be produced or spectrally modified.1 Apart from their radiative result, there is nothing that blue things have in common, and we have already seen that there is nothing in the structure of that radiation which could serve as counterparts to the unique hues or the opponence of complementary hues.
I conclude that objectivism fails. It fails because nothing in the domain of objects, properties and processes beyond our skins is both causally connected with our colour experiences and models the essential characteristics of colours. Given the physical world as we understand it, objectivism is necessarily false. This is, of course, not to say that objectivism is false in all possible worlds.
So if a physicist is to find a place for colour in the natural order, he must turn to some form of the doctrine which holds that colours of physical objects are to be understood as dispositions of those objects to affect perceivers in a suitable fashion. We may call that doctrine subjectivism. Subjectivism is at least as old as the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and has more often been given a dualist rather than a physicalist formulation. find a place for colours in a world of objects characterized by the predicates of physics alone. If that project is to be realized, perceivers must be similarly characterizable. We must then take impressions to be (or to be supervenient upon) physical states of perceivers, as Campbell does but as Newton and many other subjectivists do not. We require physical-here, physiologicalstates whose structure models the internal relations of colour. Given such states, the relational properties which have them as constituents might then in turn model the colour relations.
Within It is plain that we now can account for the distinction between unique and binary hues as well as the red-green and yellow-blue opponent relationships. Several other phenomena, ranging from the colours of afterimages to the marked desaturation of yellow when compared with the other 'pure' hues may likewise be explained. On the other hand, many important colour phenomena, notably simultaneous chromatic contrast and so-called 'colour constancy,' cannot be entirely accounted for at this relatively early It is important to notice that the relational predicates which, on the subjectivist account, assign colours to physical objects, will be significantly more peculiar-not just more complicated-than most philosophers seem to realize. We must, of course, include a characterization of both 'normal' observers and 'standard' conditions. I have elsewhere suggested how problematic these are,2 but a couple of points might usefully be made here. Philosophers often assume, for instance, that normal observers are simply those observers who can make larger numbers of wavelengths discriminations than non-normal observers. This rules out the 'colourblind' -dichromats and monochromats who require only two coloured lights or one coloured light to match any given hue. But there also exist deviant observers known as anomalous trichromats, many of whom have wavelength discrimination capabilities which are quite as acute as 'normal' trichromats.3 Probably because of deviations from average peak cone responses, the anomalous trichromat's hue responses are shifted with respect to more typical observers. He may, for example, locate unique green at 520 nm. Even among 'normals', the perception of unique green may vary from one subject to another by as much as io nm on either side of 503 nm. (The location of unique hues for a given observer is, however, precisely repeatable from one observation to another.) These are easily noticeable differences: a 505 nm stimulus may look unique green for Jones, yellowish green for Smith, and blueish green for Adams. What saves the stability of ordinary colour terms is that they are crude. But in precise applications such as industrial colour matching, the variations even among 'normals' is serious enough for the Commission International de l'Eclairage to standardize its tests on an artificial 'Standard Observer' which, in turn, is useful for comparative colour judgements (sample X matches sample Y) but useless for absolute ones (sample X looks yellowish red).' Practical uses aside,, subject variability poses a serious challenge to the particular subjectivist position we are now considering, for if it is axiomatic that every hue must be determinate, how can we determine without unacceptable arbitrariness that sample X is a unique rather than a yellowish or bluish green? We may place colours in the world as homocentric but not as idiocentric properties. The problem of specifying normal conditions for viewing the 'true' colours of objects is equally vexing. Sunlight is the most usual candidate, for instance, but it is hardly the best condition for viewing fluorescent colours or the colours of stars or bioluminescent fish. Colours interact, so the surround of a colour sample is crucial to its appearance. Furthermore, no single choice of surround will yield all possible colour experiences, eg. of silver, the browns, or the blacks.2 In fact, the specification of standard conditions will depend upon our intentions: what do we wish to see? 'The thing's true colours' is not a useful answer to that question.
There are still other problems in the form of anomalous sources of colour experiences, eg. the Butterfield encoder, which can transmit colour television pictures using only black-and-white equipment.3 The subjectivist can no doubt construct his relational colour predicates to handle such odd cases (there aren't very many of them), but it is not obvious that there is a right way to legislate each case, that there is a fact of the matter to which we must attend. Together with the previous considerations, it looks as though the dispositions to which we would connect our colour terms, selected 
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The Butterfield encoder was never commercially viable because the colour presentation, although tolerably accurate, had an inherent and ineradicable flicker. For a discussion of the decoder and related 'subjective colour' effects, see Sheppard, ibid. ch. 7, esp. pp. 151-152. Also see Hurvich, ibid. pp.
I88-I93.
as they are by contexts and interests, will be subjective in a rather robust sense of the word. In sum, it seems likely that the subjectivist can at least in principle construct a set of relational predicates which will function very much like the non-relational color predicates of ordinary speech. Furthermore, these predicates need involve no basic predicates beyond those of scientific discourse. Whether in so doing the subjectivist captures the sense of 'colour' philosophers have in mind when they ask whether, in a world of scientific objects, anything is coloured, I don't know, because it's often not clear to me what they had in mind in the first place. People who wish to say four-square that afterimages are coloured will find the particular version of subjectivism presented here to be quite inadequate. Some hair-shirt physicalists may be prepared to say nothing is coloured, so our ordinary attributions of colours to things are, if taken literally, simply false. But a physicalist who is not prepared to reject our colour attributions tout court must embrace subjectivism, warts and all. Since objectivism is false, it's the only game in town. 
